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Abstract
In this paper we show that for any mechanism design problem with the objective of maxi-
mizing social welfare, the exponential mechanism can be implemented as a truthful mechanism
while still preserving differential privacy. Our instantiation of the exponential mechanism can
be interpreted as a generalization of the VCG mechanism in the sense that the VCG mechanism
is the extreme case when the privacy parameter goes to infinity. To our knowledge, this is the
first general tool for designing mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private.
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1 Introduction
In mechanism design a central entity seeks to allocate resources among a set of selfish agents in
order to optimize a specific objective function such as revenue or social welfare. Each agent has a
private valuation for the resources being allocated, which is commonly referred to as her type. A
major challenge in designing mechanisms for problems of resource allocation among selfish agents is
getting them to reveal their true types. While in principle mechanisms can be designed to optimize
some objective function even when agents are not truthful, the analysis of such mechanisms is
complicated and the vast majority of mechanisms are designed to incentivize agents to be truthful.
One reason that an agent might not want to be truthful is that lying gives her a better payoff.
Research in algorithmic mechanism design has mostly focused on this possibility and has success-
fully designed computationally-efficient incentive-compatible mechanisms for many problems , i.e.,
mechanisms where each agent achieves optimal payoff by bidding truthfully (see [24] for a survey
of results). However, a second reason that an agent might not bid truthfully is that the privacy of
her type might itself be of value to her. Bidding truthfully could well result in an outcome that
reveals the private type of an agent.
Consider for example, a matching market in which n oil companies are bidding for n oil fields.
A company may have done extensive research in figuring out its valuations for each field. It may
regard this information as giving it competitive advantage and seek to protect its privacy. If it
participates in a traditional incentive-compatible mechanism, say, the VCG mechanism, it has two
choices – 1) bid truthfully, get the optimum payoff but potentially reveal private information or 2)
introduce random noise into its bid to (almost) preserve privacy, but settle for a suboptimal payoff.
In this and more generally in multi-agent settings where each agent’s type is multidimensional, we
aim to answer the following question:
Can we design mechanisms that simultaneously achieve near optimal social welfare, are
incentive compatible, and protect the privacy of each agent?
The notion of privacy we will consider is differential privacy, which is a paradigm for private
data analysis developed in the past decade, aiming to reveal information about the population as a
whole, while protecting the privacy of each individual (E.g., see surveys [13, 14] and the reference
therein).
Our Results and Techniques
Our main contribution is a novel instantiation of the exponential mechanism for any mechanism
design problem with payments, that aims to maximize social welfare. We show that our version
of the exponential mechanism is incentive compatible and individually rational1, while preserving
differential privacy. In fact, we show that the exponential mechanism can be interpreted as a
natural generalization of the VCG mechanism in the sense that the VCG mechanism is the special
case when the privacy parameter goes to infinity. Alternatively, our mechanism can be viewed as an
affine maximum-in-distributed-range mechanism with Shannon entropy providing the offsets. We
will formally define affine maximum-in-distributed-range mechanisms in Section 2 and more details
on this observation are deferred to Section 3.1. Readers are referred to [8, 10, 11, 9] for recent
applications of maximum-in-distributed-range mechanisms in algorithmic mechanism design.
1Here, we consider individual rationality in expectation. Achieving individual rationality in the ex-post sense is
impossible for any non-trivial private mechanism since the probability of a non-zero price would have to jump by an
infinitely large factor as an agent changes from zero valuation to non-zero valuation.
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Our proof is by connecting the exponential mechanism to the Gibbs measure and free energy
in statistical mechanics. We exploit this connection to provide a simple proof of the incentive
compatibility of the mechanism. We believe this intriguing connection is of independent interest
and may lead to new ways of understanding the exponential mechanism and differential privacy.
While we do not have an efficient way of computing the allocation and prices of the exponential
mechanism in general (this is also not known for VCG), we do show that in special cases such
as multi-item auctions and procurement auctions for spanning tree, we can efficiently implement
the exponential mechanism either exactly or approximately. Further, we show that the trade-off
between privacy and social welfare in the exponential mechanism is asymptotically optimal in these
two cases, even if we compare to mechanisms that need not be truthful. We also include another
application of the exponential mechanism for the combinatorial public project problem where the
social welfare is close to optimal for an arbitrarily small constant ǫ.
Interestingly, our implementation of the exponential mechanism for multi-item auctions has fur-
ther implications in the recent work on blackbox reductions in Bayesian mechanism design [17, 3].
Combining our exponential mechanism for the matching market with the blackbox reduction proce-
dure in [17, 3], we can get a blackbox reduction that converts any algorithm into BIC, differentially
private mechanisms. We will leave further discussions to the relevant section.
Related Work
McSherry and Talwar [23] first proposed using differentially private mechanisms to design auctions
by pointing out that differential privacy implies approximate incentive compatibility as well as
resilience to collusion. In particular, they study the problem of revenue maximization in digital
auctions and attribute auctions. They propose the exponential mechanism as a solution for these
problems. McSherry and Talwar also suggest using the exponential mechanism to solve mechanism
design problems with different objectives, such as social welfare.2 Their instantiation of the expo-
nential mechanism is differentially private, but only approximately truthful. Nissim et al. [25] show
how to convert differentially private mechanisms into exactly truthful mechanism in some settings.
However, the mechanism loses its privacy property after such conversion. Xiao [29] seeks to design
mechanisms that are both differentially private and perfectly truthful and proposes a method to
convert any truthful mechanism into a differentially private and truthful one when the type space
is small. Unfortunately, it does not seem possible to extend the results in [25, 29] to more gen-
eral mechanism design problems, while our result applies to any mechanism design problem (with
payments).
Xiao [29] also proposed to explicitly model the agents’ concern for privacy in the utilities by
assuming agent i has a disutility that depends on the amount of information ǫi leaked by the
mechanism. Chen et al. [7] and Nissim et al. [25] explored this direction and introduced truthful
mechanisms for some specific problems. Exact evaluation of an agent’s dis-utility usually requires
knowledge of the types of all agents and hence this kind of mechanism can only be private if agents
do not need to exactly compute their own dis-utility. The above works circumvent this issue by
designing strictly truthful and sufficiently private mechanisms such that any agent’s gain in privacy
by lying is outweighed by the loss in the usual notion of utility, regardless of the exact value of
dis-utility for privacy.
Finally, Ghosh and Roth [16] study the problem of selling privacy in auctions, which can be
viewed as an orthogonal approach to combining mechanism design and differential privacy.
2The main difference between our instantiation of the exponential mechanism and that by McSherry and Talwar
is that we use properly chosen payments to incentivize agents to report truthfully.
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2 Preliminaries
A mechanism design problem is defined by a set of n agents and a range R of feasible outcomes.
Throughout this paper we will assume the range R to be discrete, but all our results can be easily
extended to continuous ranges with appropriate integrability. Each agent i has a private valuation
vi : R 7→ [0, 1]. A central entity chooses one of the outcomes based on the agents’ (reported)
valuations. We will let 0 denote the all-zero valuation and let v−i denote the valuations of every
agent except i.
For the sake of presentation, we will assume that the agents’ valuations can be any functions
mapping the range of feasible outcomes to the interval [0, 1]. It is worth noting that since our
mechanisms are incentive compatible in this setting, they are also automatically incentive compat-
ible for more restricted valuations (e.g., submodular valuations for a combinatorial public project
problem).
A mechanism M consists of an allocation rule x(·) and a payment rule p(·). The mechanism
first lets the agents submit their valuations. However, an agent may strategically submit a false
valuation if that is beneficial to her. We will let b1, . . . , bn : R 7→ [0, 1] denote the reported valuations
(bids) from the agents and let b denote the vector of these valuations. After the agents submit
their bids, the allocation rule x(·) chooses a feasible outcome r = x(b) ∈ R and the payment rule
p(·) chooses a vector of payments p(b) ∈ Rn. We will let pi(b) denote the payment for agent i. Note
that both x(·) and p(·) may be randomized. We will consider the standard setting of quasi-linear
utility: given the allocation rule, the payment rule, and the reported valuations b, for each i ∈ [n],
the utility of agent i is
ui(vi, x(b), pi(b)) = vi(x(b)) − pi(b) .
We will assume the agents are risk-neutral and aim to maximize their expected utilities.
The goal is to design polynomial time mechanisms M that satisfy various objectives. In this
paper, we will focus on the problem of maximizing the expected social welfare, which is defined to
be the sum of the agents’ valuations: E[
∑n
i=1 vi(x(b))].
Besides the expected social welfare, we take into consideration the strategic play of utility-
maximizing agents and their concern about the mechanism leaking non-trivial information about
their private data. Thus, we will restrict our attention to mechanisms that satisfy several game-
theoretic requirements and have a privacy guarantee that we will define in the rest of this section.
2.1 Game-Theoretical Solution Concepts
A mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) if truth-telling is a dominant strategy, i.e., by reporting
the true values an agent always maximizes her expected utility regardless of what other agents
do - vi ∈ argmaxbi E[vi(x(bi, b−i)) − pi(bi, b−i)]. We will also consider an approximate notion of
truthfulness. A mechanism is γ-incentive compatible (γ-IC) if no agent can get more than γ extra
utility by lying. Further, a mechanism is individually rational (IR) if the expected utility of each
agent is always non-negative, assuming this agent reports truthfully: E[vi(x(vi, b−i))−pi(vi, b−i)] ≥
0. We seek to design mechanisms that are incentive compatible and individually rational.
Affine Maximum-In-Distributed-Range An allocation rule x(·) is an affine maximum-in-
distributed-range allocation if there is a set S of distributions over feasible outcomes, parameters
a1, . . . , an ∈ R+, and an offset function c : S 7→ R, such that the x(v1, . . . , vn) always chooses the
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distribution ν ∈ S that maximizes
E
r∼ν
[
n∑
i=1
aivi(r)
]
+ c(ν) .
In this paper, we are particularly interested in the case when ai = 1, ∀i ∈ [n], and c is the Shannon
entropy of the distribution scaled by an appropriate parameter.
The affine maximum-in-distributed-range mechanisms can be interpreted as slight generaliza-
tions of the well-studied maximum-in-distributed-range mechanisms. If ai = 1 for every i ∈ [n] and
c(·) = 0, then such allocation rules are referred to as maximum-in-distributed-range (MIDR) allo-
cations. There are well-known techniques for charging proper prices to make MIDR allocations and
their affine generalizations incentive compatible. The resulting mechanisms are called MIDR mech-
anisms. MIDR mechanisms are important tools for designing computationally efficient mechanisms
that are incentive compatible and approximate social welfare well (e.g., see [8, 10, 9, 11]).
2.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a notion of privacy that has been studied the most in the theoretical computer
science community over the past decade. It requires the distribution of outcomes to be nearly
identical when the agent profiles are nearly identical. Formally,
Definition 1. Amechanism is ǫ-differentially private if for any two valuation profiles v = (v1, . . . , vn)
and v′ = (v′1, . . . , v
′
n) such that only one agent has different valuations in the two profiles, and for
any set of outcomes S ⊆ R, we have
Pr[x(v) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ǫ) ·Pr[x(v′) ∈ S] .
This definition of privacy has many appealing theoretical properties. Readers are referred to
[13, 14] for excellent surveys on the subject.
We will also consider a standard variant that defines a more relaxed notion of privacy.
Definition 2. A mechanism is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if for any two valuation profile v =
(v1, . . . , vn) and v
′ = (v′1, . . . , v
′
n) such that only one agent has different valuations in the two
profiles, and for any set of outcomes S ⊆ R,
Pr[x(v) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ǫ) ·Pr[x(v′) ∈ S] + δ .
Typically, we will consider very small values of δ, say, δ = exp(−n).
Differentially Private Payment In the above definitions, we only consider the privacy of the
allocation rule. We note that in practice, the payments need to be differentially private as well. We
can handle privacy issues in the payments by the standard technique of adding Laplace noise. In
particular, if the payments are implemented via secure channels (e.g., the same channels that the
agents use to submit their bids) such that the each agent’s payment is accessible only by the agent
herself and the central entity, then adding independent Laplace noise with standard deviation
O(ǫ−1) is sufficient to guarantee ǫ-differentially private payments. Since the techniques used to
handle payments are quite standard, we will defer the extended discussion of this subject to the
appendix.
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1. Choose outcome r ∈ R with probability Pr[r] ∝ exp ( ǫ2∑i vi(r)).
2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, charge agent i price
pi = − E
r∼ExpRǫ (bi,b−i)
∑
k 6=i
bk(r)
− 2
ǫ
· S (ExpRǫ (bi, b−i))+ 2ǫ ln
∑
r∈R
exp
 ǫ
2
∑
k 6=i
vk(r)
 ,
where S(·) is the Shannon entropy.
Figure 1: ExpRǫ : the incentive-compatible exponential mechanism.
2.3 The Exponential Mechanism
One powerful tool in the differential privacy literature is the exponential mechanism of McSherry
and Talwar [23]. The exponential mechanism is a general technique for constructing differentially
private algorithms over an arbitrary range R of outcomes and any objective function Q(D, r) (often
referred to as the quality function in the differential privacy literature) that maps a pair consisting
of a data set D and a feasible outcome r ∈ R to a real-valued score. In our setting, D is a (reported)
valuation profile and the quality function Q(v, r) =
∑n
i=1 vi(r) is the social welfare.
Given a range R, a data set D, a quality function Q, and a privacy parameter ǫ, the exponential
mechanism Exp(R,D,Q, ǫ) chooses an outcome r from the range R with probability
Pr [Exp(R,D,Q, ǫ) = r] ∝ exp
( ǫ
2∆
Q(D, r)
)
,
where ∆ is the Lipschitz constant of the quality function Q, that is, for any two adjacent data
set D1 and D2, and for any outcome r, the score Q(D1, r) and Q(D2, r) differs by at most ∆. In
out setting, the Lipschitz constant of the social welfare function is 1. We sometimes use Exp(D, ǫ)
for short when the range R and the quality function Q is clear from the context. We will use the
following theorem about the exponential mechanism.
Theorem 1 (E.g., [23, 28]). The exponential mechanism is ǫ-differentially private and ensures that
Pr
[
Q(D,Exp(D, ǫ)) < max
r∈R
Q(D, r)− ln |R|
ǫ
− t
ǫ
]
≤ exp(−t) .
3 The Exponential Mechanism is Incentive Compatible
In this section, we will show that if we choose the social welfare to be the quality function, then the
exponential mechanism can be implemented in an incentive compatible and individually rational
manner. Formally, for any range R and any privacy parameter ǫ > 0, the exponential mechanism
Exp
R
ǫ with its pricing scheme is presented in Figure 1. Our main theorem is the following:
Theorem 2. The exponential mechanism with our pricing scheme is IC and IR.
Our proof of Theorem 2 relies on the connection between the exponential mechanism and a
well known probability measure in probability and statistical mechanics called the Gibbs measure.
Once we have established this connection, the proof of Theorem 2 becomes very simple.
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Table 1: A high-level comparison between the Gibbs measure and the exponential mechanism
Gibbs measure Exponential mechanism
Probability mass function Pr[state = i] ∝ exp
(
− 1kBTEi
)
Pr[outcome = r] ∝ exp ( ǫ2∆Q(r))
Objective function −Ei Q(r)
Measure of uncertainty temperature T privacy parameter ǫ
Environment parameter Boltzmann constant kB Lipschitz constant ∆
3.1 The Exponential Mechanism and the Gibbs Measure
The Gibbs measure, also known as the Boltzmann distribution in chemistry and physics, is formally
defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Gibbs measure). Suppose we have a system consisting of particles of a gas. If the
particles have k states 1, . . . , k, possessing energy E1, . . . , Ek respectively, then the probability that
a random particle in the system has state i follows the Gibbs measure:
Pr[state = i] ∝ exp
(
− 1
kBT
Ei
)
,
where T is the temperature, and kB is the Boltzmann constant.
Note that the Gibbs measure asserts that nature prefers states with lower energy level. Indeed,
if T → 0, then almost surely we will see a particle with lowest-energy state. On the other hand,
if T → +∞, then all states are equally likely to appear. Thus the temperature T is a measure of
uncertainty in the system: the lower the temperature, the less uncertainty in the system, and vice
versa.
Gibbs Measure vs. Exponential Mechanism It is not difficult to see the analogy between
the Gibbs measure and the exponential mechanism. Firstly, the quality Q(r) of an outcome r ∈ R
(in our instantiation, Q(r) is the social welfare
∑
i vi(r)) is an analog of the energy (more precisely,
the negative of the energy) of a state i. In the exponential mechanism the goal is to maximize the
expected quality of the outcome, while in physics nature tries to minimize the expected energy.
Second, the privacy parameter ǫ is an analogue of the inverse temperature T−1, both measuring
the level of uncertainty in the system. The more privacy we want in the mechanism, the more
uncertainty we need to impose in the distribution of outcomes3. Finally, the Lipschitz constant
∆ and Boltzmann constant kB are both scaling factors that come from the environment. Table 1
summarize this connection between the Gibbs measure and the exponential mechanism.
Gibbs Measure Minimizes Free Energy It is well-known that the Gibbs measure maximizes
entropy given the expected energy. In fact, a slightly stronger claim (e.g., see [22]) states that
the Gibbs measure minimizes free energy. To be precise, suppose T is the temperature, ν is a
3We note that the privacy guarantee ǫ is not necessarily a monotone function of the entropy of the outcome
distribution. So the statement above is only for the purpose of establishing a high-level connection between the
Gibbs measure and the exponential mechanism.
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distribution over the states, and S(ν) is the Shannon entropy of ν. Then the free energy of the
system is
F (ν, T ) = E
i∼ν
[Ei]− kBT · S(ν) .
The following result is well known in the statistical physics literature.
Theorem 3 (E.g., see [22]). F (ν, T ) is minimized when ν is the Gibbs measure.
For self-containedness, we include the proof of Theorem 3 as follows.
Proof. Note that the free energy can be written as
F (ν, T ) = E
i∼ν
[Ei]− kBT · S(ν)
=
∑
i
Pr
ν
[i]Ei + kBT
∑
i
Pr
ν
[i] lnPr
ν
[i] . (1)
Further, the first term of the right hand side can be rewritten as∑
i
Pr
ν
[i]Ei = kBT
∑
i
Pr
ν
[i]
1
kBT
Ei
= −kBT
∑
i
Pr
ν
[i] ln
(
exp
(
− 1
kBT
Ei
))
= −kBT
∑
i
Pr
ν
[i] ln
 exp
(
− 1kBTEi
)
∑
j exp
(
− 1kBTEj
)
− kBT ln
∑
j
exp
(
− 1
kBT
Ej
)
= −kBT
∑
i
Pr
ν
[i] ln
(
Pr
Gibbs
[i]
)
− kBT ln
∑
j
exp
(
− 1
kBT
Ej
) . (2)
By (1) and (2), the free energy equals
F (ν, T ) = kBT ·DKL(ν ||Gibbs)− kBT ln
∑
j
exp
(
− 1
kBT
Ej
) .
Note that the second term is independent of ν. By basic properties of the KL-divergence, the above
is minimized when ν is the Gibbs measure.
3.2 Proof of Theorem 2
By the connection between Gibbs measure and exponential mechanism and Theorem 3, we have
the following analogous lemma for our instantiation of the exponential mechanism.
Lemma 4. The free social welfare,
E
r∼ν
[∑
i
vi(r)
]
+
2
ǫ
· S(ν) ,
is maximized when ν = ExpRǫ (v1, . . . , vn).
7
Incentive Compatibility Let us consider a particular agent i, and fix the bids b−i of the other
agents. Suppose agent i has value vi and bids bi. For notational convenience, we let b(r) =∑n
k=1 bk(r) and let
hi(b−i) =
2
ǫ
ln
∑
r∈R
exp
 ǫ
2
∑
k 6=i
vk(r)
 .
Using the price pi charged to agent i as in Figure 1, her utility when she bids bi is
E
r∼ExpRǫ (bi,b−i)
[vi(r) +
∑
k 6=i
bk(r)] +
2
ǫ
· S(ExpRǫ (bi, b−i))− hi(b−i) ,
which equals the free social welfare plus a term that does not depend on agent i’s bid. By Lemma 4,
the free social welfare is maximized when we use the outcome distribution by the exponential
mechanism with respect to agent i’s true value. Therefore, truthful bidding is a utility-maximizing
strategy for agent i.
Individual Rationality We first note that for any agent i, it is not difficult to verify that pi = 0
when vi = 0 regardless of bidding valuations of other agents. Therefore, by bidding 0 agent i
could always guarantee non-negative expected utility. Since we have shown that the exponential
mechanism is truthful-in-expectation, we get that the utility of agent i when she truthfully reports
her valuation is always non-negative.
Remark 1. We notice that Lemma 4 implies that the allocation rule of the exponential mechanism
is affine maximum-in-distributed-range. As a result, there are standard techniques to charge prices
so that the mechanisms is IC and IR as presented above.
Remark 2. Alternatively, one can prove Theorem 2 via the procedure developed by Rochet [27]:
first prove the cyclic monotonicity of the exponential allocation rule, which is known to be the
necessary and sufficient condition for being the allocation rule of a truthful mechanism; then derive
the pricing scheme that rationalizes the exponential allocation rule via Rochet’s characterization.
We will omit further details of this proof in this extended abstract.
4 Generalization
In the original definition by McSherry and Talwar [23], the exponential mechanism is defined with
respect to a prior distribution µ(·) over the feasible range R. More precisely, the exponential
mechanism given µ, Expµ(R,D,Q, ǫ), chooses an outcome r from the range R with probability
Pr [Expµ(R,D,Q, ǫ) = r] ∝ µ(r) exp
( ǫ
2∆
Q(D, r)
)
.
When µ is chosen to be the uniform distribution over the feasible range, we recover the definition
in Section 2. Using a different µ can improve computational efficiency as well as the trade-off
between privacy and the objective for some problems (e.g., [5]). In every use of the (generalized)
exponential mechanism, to our knowledge, µ is taken to be the uniform distribution over a sub-
range that forms a geometric covering of the feasible range. But in general, this need not be the
optimal choice.
We observe that our result can be extended to the above generalized exponential mechanism as
well. More precisely, we can show that the generalized exponential mechanism is affine maximum-
in-distributed-range as well.
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Theorem 5. For any range R, any quality function Q, any privacy parameter ǫ, any prior distri-
bution µ, and any database D, the generalized exponential mechanism satisfies
Expµ(R,D,Q, ǫ) = argmax
ν
E
r∼ν
[Q(D, r)]− 2
ǫ
DKL(ν||µ) .
Corollary 6. For any mechanism design problem for social welfare and any prior distribution
µ over the feasible range, the generalized exponential mechanism (w.r.t. µ) is IC and IR with
appropriate payment rule.
The proof of Theorem 5 and deriving the pricing scheme in Corollary 6 is very similar to the
corresponding parts in Section 3 and hence omitted.
5 Applications
Our result in Theorem 2 applies to a large family of problems. In fact, it can be used to derive truth-
ful and differentially private mechanisms for any problem in mechanism design (with payments)
that aims for social welfare maximization.
In this section, we will consider three examples – the combinatorial public project problem
(CPPP), the multi-item auction, and the procurement auction for a spanning tree. The exponen-
tial mechanism for the combinatorial public project problem is incentive compatible, ǫ-differentially
private, and achieves nearly optimal social welfare for any constant ǫ > 0. However, we cannot
implement the exponential mechanism in polynomial time for CPPP in general because implement-
ing VCG for CPPP is known to be NP-hard and the exponential mechanism is a generalization
of VCG. For the other two applications, we manage to implement the exponential mechanism in
polynomial time, where the implementation for multi-item auction is only approximate so that it is
only approximately truthful and approximately differentially private, and the implementation for
procurement auction for spanning trees is exact. The social welfare for these two cases, however, is
nearly optimal only when the privacy parameter ǫ is super-constantly large. Nonetheless, we show
that the trade-offs between privacy and social welfare of the exponential mechanism in these two
applications are asymptotically optimal.
5.1 Combinatorial Public Project Problem
The first interesting application of our result is a truthful and differentially private mechanism
for the Combinatorial Public Project Problem (CPPP) originally proposed by Papadimitriou et
al. [26]. In CPPP, there are n agents and m public projects. Each agent i has a private valuation
function vi that specifies agent i’s value (between 0 and 1) for every subset of public projects. The
objective is to find a subset S of public projects to build, of size at most k (a parameter), that
maximizes the social welfare, namely,
∑
i vi(S).
This problem has received a lot of attention in the algorithmic game theory literature because
strong lower bounds can be shown for the approximation ratio of this problem by any truthful
mechanism when the valuations are submodular (e.g., see [26, 12]).
Further, the CPPP is of practical interest as well. The following is a typical CPPP scenario
in the real world. Suppose some central entity (e.g., the government) wants to build several new
hospitals where there are m potential locations to choose from. Due to resource constraints, the
government can only build k hospitals. Each citizen has a private value for each subset of locations
that may depend on the distance to the closest hospital and the citizen’s health status.
Note that the agents may be concerned about their privacy if they choose to participate in
the mechanism because their valuations typically contain sensitive information. For example, the
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citizens who have high values for having a hospital close by in the above scenario are more likely
to have health problems. Therefore, it would be interesting to design mechanisms for the CPPP
that are not only truthful but also differentially private. The size of the range of outcomes is(
m
k
)
= O(mk). So by Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we have the following.
Theorem 7. For any ǫ > 0, the exponential mechanism ExpCPPPǫ for CPPP is IC, ǫ-differentially
private, and ensures
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
vi
(
Exp
CPPP
ǫ
)
< opt− k lnm
ǫ
− t
ǫ
]
≤ exp(−t) .
It is known that the exponential mechanism achieves the optimal trade-off between privacy and
social welfare for CPPP (e.g., [28]).
Further, note that the optimal social welfare could be as large as n. Moreover, the number of
projects k ≤ m is typically much smaller than the number of agents n. Therefore, the exponential
mechanism achieves social welfare that is close to optimal. However, it is worth noting that we
only requires k and m to be mildly smaller than n (e.g., O(n1−c) for any small constant c > 0), in
which cases the size of the type space, which is exponential in k and m, is still quite large so that
the approach in [29] does not apply.
In some scenarios such as the one above where the government wants to build a few new
hospitals, k is sufficiently small so that it is acceptable to have running time polynomial in the size
of the range of outcomes. In such cases, it is easy to see that the exponential mechanism for CPPP
can be implemented in time polynomial in n and
(m
k
)
.
5.2 Multi-Item Auction
Next we consider a multi-item auction. Here, the auctioneer has n heterogeneous items (one copy
of each item) that she wishes to allocate to n different agents4. Agent i has a private valuation
vi = (vi1, . . . , vik), where vij is her value for item j. We will assume the agents are unit-demand,
that is, each agent wants at most one item. It is easy to see that each feasible allocation of the
multi-item auction is a matching between agents and items. We will let the RM denote the range
of multi-item auction, that is, the set Πn of all permutations on [n].
The multi-item auction and related problems are very well-studied in the algorithmic game
theory literature (e.g., [7, 4]). They capture the motivating scenario of allocating oil fields and
many other problems that arise from allocating public resources. The VCG mechanism can be
implemented in polynomial time to maximize social welfare in this problem since max-matching
can be solved in polynomial time. The new twist in our setting is to design mechanisms that are
both truthful and differentially private and have good social welfare guarantee.
Approximate Implementation of the Exponential Mechanism Unfortunately, exactly
sampling matchings according to the distribution specified in the exponential mechanism seems
hard due to its connection to the problem of computing the permanent of non-negative matrices
(e.g., see [18]), which is #P -complete. Instead, we will sample from the desired distribution approx-
imately. Moreover, we show that there is an efficient approximate implementation of the payment
scheme. As a result of the non-exact implementation, we only get γ-IC instead of perfect IC,
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy instead of ǫ-differential privacy, and lose an additional nγ additive factor
4The case when the number of items is not the same as the number of agents can be reduced to this case by adding
dummy items or dummy agents. So our setting is w.l.o.g.
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in social welfare. Here, γ will be inverse polynomially small. The discussion of this approximate
implementation of the exponential mechanism is deferred to the full version.
Note that the size of the range of feasible outcomes of multi-item auction is n!. By Theorem 1,
we have the following:
Theorem 8. For any δ ∈ (0, 1), ǫ > 0, γ > 0, there is a polynomial time (in n, ǫ−1, γ−1, and
log(δ−1)) approximate implementation of the exponential mechanism, Êxp
RM
ǫ that is γ-IC, (ǫ, δ)-
differentially private, and ensures that
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
vi
(
Êxp
RM
ǫ
)
< opt− γn− ln(n!)
ǫ
− t
ǫ
]
≤ exp(−t) .
Note that here we are achieving γ-IC and (ǫ, δ)-differentially privacy while in the instantiation
of the exponential mechanism by McSherry and Talwar [23] is ǫ-IC and ǫ-differentially private. Our
result in Theorem 8 is better in most applications since typically ǫ is large, usually a constant or
occasionally a super-constant, while γ is small, usually requires to be 1/poly for γ-IC to be an
appealing solution concept.
The trade-off between privacy and social welfare in Theorem 8 can be interpreted as the follows:
if we want to achieve social welfare that is worse than optimal by at most an O(n) additive term,
then we need to choose ǫ = Ω(log n). The next theorem shows that this is tight. The proof is
deferred to the full version.
Theorem 9. Suppose M is an ǫ-differentially private mechanism for the multi-item auction problem
and the expected welfare achieve by M is at least opt− n10 . Then ǫ = Ω(log n).
Note that in this theorem, we do not restrict M to be incentive compatible. In other word,
this lower bound holds for arbitrary differentially private mechanisms. So there is no extra cost for
imposing the truthfulness constraint.
Implication in BIC Blackbox Reduction Recently, Hartline et al. [17] and Bei and Huang [3]
introduce blackbox reductions that convert any algorithm into nearly Bayesian incentive-compatible
mechanisms with only a marginal loss in the social welfare. Both approach essentially create a
virtual interface for each agent which has the structure of a matching market and then run VCG
in the virtual matching markets. By running the exponential mechanism instead of the VCG
mechanism, we can obtain a blackbox reduction that converts any algorithm into a nearly Bayesian
incentive-compatible and differentially private mechanism. We will defer more details to the full
version of this paper.
5.3 Procurement Auction for Spanning Trees
Another interesting application is the procurement auction for a spanning tree (e.g., see [6]). Pro-
curement auctions (also known as reverse auctions) are a type of auction where the roles of buyers
and sellers are reversed. In other word, the central entity seeks to buy, instead of sell, items or ser-
vices from the agents. In particular in the procurement auction for spanning trees, consider n =
(k
2
)
selfish agents own edges in a publicly known network of k nodes. We shall imagine the nodes to be
cities and the edges as potential highways connecting cities. Each agent i has a non-negative cost
ci for building a highway along the corresponding edge. The central entity (e.g., the government)
wants to purchase a spanning tree from the network so that she can build highways to connect
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the cities. The goal is to design incentive compatible and differentially private mechanisms that
provide good social welfare (minimizing total cost).
Although this is a reverse auction in which agents have costs instead of values and the payments
are from the central entity to the agents, by interpreting the costs as the negative of the valuations
(i.e. vi = −ci if the edge is purchased and vi = 0 otherwise), we can show that the exponential
mechanism with the same payment scheme is incentive compatible for procurement auctions via
almost identical proofs. We will omit the details in this extended abstract.
Next, we will discuss how to efficiently implement the exponential mechanism.
Sampling Spanning Trees There has been a large body of literature on sampling spanning
tree (e.g., see [21] and the reference therein). Recently, Asadpour et al. [1] have developed a
polynomial time algorithm for sampling entropy-maximizing distributions, which is exactly the
kind of distribution used by the exponential mechanism. Therefore, the allocation rule of the
exponential mechanism can be implemented in polynomial time for the spanning tree auction.
Implicit Payment Scheme by Babaioff, Kleinberg, and Slivkins [2] Although we can
efficiently generate samples from the desired distribution, it is not clear how to compute the exact
payment explicitly. Fortunately, Babaioff et al. [2, 20] provide a general method of computing an
unbiased estimator for the payment given any rationalizable allocation rule5. Hence, we can use
the implicit payment method in [2, 20] to generate the payments in polynomial time.
Note that the size of the range of feasible outcomes of spanning tree auction is the number of
different spanning tree in a complete graph with k vertices, which equals kk−2. By Theorem 1 we
have the following:
Theorem 10. For any ǫ > 0, the exponential mechanism Exptreeǫ runs in polynomial time (in k
and ǫ−1), is IC, ǫ-differentially private, and ensures that
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
ci
(
Êxp
tree
ǫ
)
> opt+
(k − 2) log k
ǫ
+
t
ǫ
]
≤ exp(−t) .
This trade-off between privacy and social welfare in Theorem 10 essentially means that we need
ǫ = Ω(log k) in order to get opt+O(k) guarantee on expected total cost. The next theorem shows
that this tradeoff is also tight. The proof is deferred to the full version due to space constraint.
Theorem 11. Suppose M is an ǫ-differentially private mechanism for the procurement auction for
spanning tree and the expected total cost by M is at most opt+ k24 . Then ǫ = Ω(log k).
Similar to the case in the multi-item auction, the above lower bound does not restrict M to be
incentive compatible. So the exponential mechanism is optimal even if we compare it to non-truthful
ones.
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In this section, we will discuss what is the amount of noise one needs to add to the payments
in order to achieve ǫ-differential privacy. We will consider two different models depending on how
the payments are implemented: the public payment model and the private payment model.
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In the public payment model, the payments of the agents will become public information at the
end of the auction, that is, the adversary who tries to learn the private valuations of the agents can
see all the payments. Therefore, a payment scheme is ǫ-differentially private in the public payment
model if and only if for any i ∈ [n], any value profiles v = (v1, . . . , vn) and v′ = (v1, . . . , v′i, . . . , vn)
that differ only in the valuation of agent i, and any possible payment profile p, the probability
Pr[p1(v), . . . , pn(v) = p]
≤ exp(ǫ)Pr[p1(v′), . . . , pn(v′) = p] .
In the private payment model, we will assume the payments are implemented via secure channels
such that the payment of each agent is only known to the corresponding agent and a few trusted
parties, e.g., the central entity who runs the mechanism and/or the bank. Here, there are two cases
based on what information the adversary can learn from the payments. If the adversary is not one
of the agents, then by our assumption, he cannot see any of the payments and therefore cannot
learn any information from the payments. If the adversary is one of the agents, then the only
information of the payments that he will have access to is his own payment. Therefore, a payment
scheme is ǫ-differentially private in the public payment model if and only if for any i 6= j ∈ [n], any
value profiles v = (v1, . . . , vn) and v
′ = (v1, . . . , v
′
i, . . . , vn) that differ only in the valuation of agent
i, and any possible payment p of agent j, the probability
Pr[pj(v) = p] ≤ exp(ǫ)Pr[pj(v′) = p] .
We will measure the amount of noise in the payments using L2 norm, that is, we aim to minimize
the total variance of the agents’ payments in the worst-case: maxv
∑n
i=1Var[pi(v)].
Next, we will proceed to analyze the amount of noise needed in each of the two models. We
will start with an upper bound on the sensitivity of each agent’s payment as a function of the bids.
Lemma 12. For any i, j ∈ [n], and any value profiles v = (v1, . . . , vn) and v′ = (v1, . . . , v′i, . . . , vn)
that only differ in the valuation of agent i, we have |pj(v)− pj(v′)| ≤ 1.
Proof. Note that by Theorem 2, the exponential mechanism is individual rational. It is also easy to
see that it has no positive transfer for that otherwise the zero-value agent could gain by lying. So by
our assumption that the agents’ valuations are always between 0 and 1, we have 0 ≤ pj(v), pj(v′) ≤
1. So Lemma 12 follows trivially.
In the public payment model, the mechanism has to reveal a vector of n real numbers (the
payments) at the end of the auction, where each entry has sensitivity 1 by Lemma 12. Therefore,
we can use the standard treatment for answering numerical queries, namely, adding independent
Laplace noise Lap(nǫ ) to each entry, where Lap(b) is the Laplace distribution with p.d.f. fLap(b)(x) =
1
2b exp
(
− |x|b
)
. More precisely, we can show the following theorem.
Theorem 13. In the public payment model, the following payment scheme is ǫ-differentially private
and has total variance O(n3/2ǫ−1), while maintaining the IC and IR in expectation: let p1, . . . , pn
be the payments specified in the exponential mechanism (Figure 1); let x1, . . . , xn be i.i.d. variables
following the Laplace distribution Lap(nǫ ); use payment scheme (p1 + x1, . . . , pn + xn).
The proof follows by standard analysis of the Laplace mechanism (e.g., see [15]). So we will omit
the details in this extended abstract. It is worth mentioning that since the problem of designing
payment scheme in the public payment model is a special case of answering n non-linear numerical
queries, it may be possible to reduce the amount of noise by using more specialized scheme on a
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problem-by-problem basis. However, we feel this is less insightful than the other results we have
in this paper, so we will focus on general mechanisms and payment schemes that work for all
mechanism design problems.
Now let us turn to the private payment model. By our previous discussion, the mechanism only
need to release at most one real number to each potential adversary in this model. So one may
expect much less noise is needed in this model. Indeed, we could again use the standard treatment
of adding Laplace noise, but this time it suffices to add independent Laplace noise Lap(1ǫ ) to each
entry.
Theorem 14. In the private payment model, the following payment scheme is ǫ-differentially
private and has total variance O(
√
nǫ−1), while maintaining the IC and IR: in expectation: let
p1, . . . , pn be the payments specified in the exponential mechanism (Figure 1); let x1, . . . , xn be
i.i.d. variables following the Laplace distribution Lap(1ǫ ); use payment scheme (p1+x1, . . . , pn+xn).
A Approximate Implementation for Multi-Item Auction
In this section, we will explain how to approximately implement the exponential mechanism in the
multi-item auction setting. The main technical tool in this section is the seminal work of Jerrem,
Sinclair, and Vigoda [19] on approximating the permanent of non-negative matrices, which can be
phrased as follows:
Lemma 15 (FPRAS for permanent of non-negative matrices [19]). For any γ > 0 and any δ ∈
(0, 1), there is an algorithm that computes the permanent of an arbitrary n×n matrix A = {aij}i,j∈[n]
up to a multiplicative factor of exp(γ) with probability at least 1−δ. The running time is polynomial
in n, γ−1, log(δ−1), and log(maxi,j∈[n] aij/mini,j∈[n] aij).
To see the connection between the permanent of non-negative matrices and implementation of
the exponential mechanism in the multi-item auction setting, we point out that the normalization
factor in the outcome distribution of the exponential mechanism is the permanent of a non-negative
matrix: ∑
r∈RM
exp
(
ǫ
2
n∑
i=1
vi(r)
)
=
∑
π∈Πn
n∏
i=1
exp
( ǫ
2
viπ[i]
)
= perm
({
exp
( ǫ
2
vij
)}
i,j∈[n]
)
.
We will let A(v) denote the matrix {exp( ǫ2vij)}i,j∈[n]. Moreover, we let A−i,−j(v) denote the
(n− 1)× (n− 1) matrix obtained by removing the ith row and the jth column of A(v).
A.1 Approximate Sampler
Now we are ready to introduce the approximate sampler for the multi-item auction.
Lemma 16. For any δ ∈ (0, 1) and γ > 0, there is a sampling algorithm whose running time
is polynomial in n, ǫ−1 γ−1, and log δ−1, such that with probability at least 1 − δ, it chooses an
outcome r with probability
Pr[r] ∈ [exp(−γ), exp(γ)]Pr[ExpRMǫ = r] .
Proof. We will recursively decide which item we will allocate to agent i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n by re-
peatedly computing an accurate estimation of the marginal distribution. Concretely, the algorithm
is given as follows:
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1. Use the FPRAS in Lemma 15 to compute perm(A−1,−j(v)) up to a multiplicative factor of
exp( γ2n ) with success probability at least 1− δn2 . Let xj denote the approximate value.
2. Sample an item j with probability Pr[j] ∝ xj.
3. Allocate item j to agent 1 and recurse on the remaining n− 1 agents and n− 1 items.
First we note that for each allocation π ∈ Πn, the probability that π is chosen as the outcome
can be decomposed into n stages by Bayes’ rule:
Pr[ExpRMǫ (v) = π] = Pr
[
agent 1 gets π[1]
] ·Pr [agent 2 gets π[2] |π[1] ]
· · ·Pr [agent n gets π[n] |π[1], . . . , π[n− 1] ] .
In the first recursion of our algorithm, we use the distribution
Pr[agent 1 gets item j] ∝ xj ≈ perm(A−1,−j(v)) .
Further, in the exponential mechanism
Pr[agent 1 gets item j in ExpRMǫ ] ∝
∑
π:π[1]=j
exp
(
ǫ
2
n∑
k=1
vkπ[k]
)
= exp
( ǫ
2
v1j
)
perm(A−1,−j(v)) .
Since xj approximate perm(A−1,−j(v)) up to an exp(
γ
2n ) factor, we know the probability that
item j is allocated to agent 1 in our algorithm approximate the correct marginal up to an exp(γn)
multiplicative factor.
Similar claim holds for the rest of the n− 1 stages as well. So the probability that we samples
a permutation π ∈ RM differs from the correct distribution by at most a exp(γn)n = exp(γ) factor.
Moreover, by union bound the failure probability is at most δ.
A.2 Approximate Payments
Next, we will turn to approximate implementation of the payment scheme. First, recall that the
payment for agent i is
pi = E
r∼Exp
RM
ǫ (v)
[vi(r)]− 2
ǫ
ln
 ∑
r∈RM
exp
(
ǫ
2
n∑
k=1
vk(r)
)+ 2
ǫ
ln
 ∑
r∈RM
exp
 ǫ
2
∑
k 6=i
vk(r)

= E
r∼Exp
RM
ǫ (v)
[vi(r)]− 2
ǫ
ln (perm (A(vi, v−i))) +
2
ǫ
ln (perm (A(0, v−i))) .
The next lemma states that we can efficiently compute an estimator for the payment pi with
inverse polynomially small bias.
Lemma 17. For any δ ∈ (0, 1) and γ ∈ (0, 1), we can compute in polynomial time (in n, ǫ−1, and
γ−1) a random estimator pˆi for pi such that the bias is small: |E[pˆi]− pi| ≤ γ.
Proof. By Lemma 15, we can efficiently estimate perm(A(vi, v−i)) and perm(A(0, v−i)) up to an
multiplicative factor of exp(γ6 ) with success probability at least 1 − γ6 . Hence, we can compute
ln(perm(A(vi, v−i)) and ln(perm(A(0, v−i))) up to additive bias of
γ
6 with probability 1− γ6 . Note
17
that the total bias introduced if the FPRAS fails is at most 1 and that could happens with prob-
ability at most γ6 . So the total bias from estimating ln(perm(A(vi, v−i))) and ln(perm(A(0, v−i)))
is at most γ2 .
It remains to compute an estimator for E
r∼Exp
RM
ǫ (v)
[vi(r)] with bias less than
γ
2 . In order to
do so, we will use the algorithm in Lemma 16 to sample an outcome r∗ from a distribution whose
probability mass function differs from that of ExpRMǫ (v) by at most a exp(
γ
6 ) factor point-wise, with
success probability at least 1− γ6 . Then we will use vi(r∗) as our estimator. Note that conditioned
on the sampler runs correctly, we have∣∣∣∣∣E[vi(r∗)]− Er∼ExpRMǫ (v)[vi(r)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ (exp(γ6)− 1) Er∼ExpRMǫ (v)[vi(r)] ≤
(
exp(
γ
6
)− 1
)
≤ γ
3
.
Moreover, the maximum bias conditioned on the failure of the sampler is at most 1, which
happens with probability at most γ6 . So the total bias from the estimator for Er∼ExpRMǫ (v)
[vi(r)] is
at most γ2 .
B Lower Bound for Multi-Item Auction
Proof of Theorem 9. Let us first define some notations. For any j∗ ∈ [n], we will let ej∗ denote the
valuation profile such that ej
∗
j = 1 if j = j
∗ and ej
∗
j = 0 if j 6= j∗. That is, an agent with valuation
ej
∗
is single-minded who only value getting item j∗ (with value 1) and has no interest in getting
any other item. We will say j∗ is the critical item for this agent.
SupposeM is an ǫ-differentially private mechanism such that M always obtain at least opt− n10
expected social welfare. Let us consider the following randomly chosen instance: each agent’s
valuation is chosen from e1, . . . , en independently and uniformly at random. Let us consider the
social welfare we get by running mechanism M on this randomly constructed instance. We first
note that Ev[opt(v)] = (1 − e−1)n for that each item has probability 1 − e−1 of being the critical
item of at least one of the agents. By our assumption, the expected welfare obtained by M shall
be at least (1− e−1)n− n10 > n2 . Therefore, we have
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Pr[M allocate j to agent i | j is critical for i]Pr[j is critical for i] ≥ n
2
.
Note that Pr[j is critical for i] = 1n for all i, j ∈ [n], we get that the average probability that a
critical item-agent pair is allocated is at least half:
1
n2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Pr[M allocate j to agent i | j is critical for i] ≥ 1
2
. (3)
Similarly, we have
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Pr[M allocate j to agent i | j is not critical for i]Pr[j is not critical for i] ≤ n
2
.
Note that Pr[j is not critical for i] = n−1n for all i, j ∈ [n], we get that the average probability
that the average probability that a non-critical item-agent pair is chosen in the allocation is very
small:
1
n2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Pr[M allocate j to agent i | j is not critical for i] ≤ 1
2(n − 1) . (4)
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By (3) and (4), we have∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1Pr[M allocate j to agent i | j is critical for i]∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1Pr[M allocate j to agent i | j is not critical for i]
≥ n− 1 .
In particular, we know there exists a (i, j) pair such that
Pr[M allocate j to agent i | j is critical for i]
Pr[M allocate j to agent i | j is not critical for i] ≥ n− 1 .
Since M is ǫ-differentially private, we get that exp(ǫ) ≥ n− 1, and thus ǫ = Ω(log n).
C Lower Bound for Procurement Auction for Spanning Trees
Proof of Theorem 11. Suppose M is an ǫ-differentially private mechanism whose expected total
cost is at most opt+ k24 .
We will consider the following randomly generated instance. Each agent i’s cost value ci is
independently chosen as
ci =

1 , w.p. 1− 1
2k
0 , w.p.
1
2k
If an agent has cost 0, we say this agent and the corresponding edge are critical. Let us first
analyze the expected value of opt for such randomly generated instances. Intuitively, we want to
pick as many critical edges as possible. In particular, when there are no cycles consists of only
critical edges, the minimum spanning tree shall pick all critical edges, which comprise a forest in
the graph, and then pick some more edges to complete the spanning tree.
Lemma 18. With probability at least 12 , there are no cycle consists of only critical edges.
Proof of Lemma 18. For each cycle of length t, the probability that all edges on this cycle are
critical is (2k)−t. Note that the number of cycles of length t is at most
(k
t
)
(t− 1)! ≤ kt. Here (kt) is
the number of subsets of t vertices and (t−1)! is the number of different Hamiltonian cycles among
t vertices. Hence, by union bound, the probability that there is any cycle consists of only critical
edges is at most
∑k
t=2(2k)
−t · kt =∑kt=2 2−t < 12 .
Moreover, by Chernoff-Ho¨effding bound, we have that the number of critical edges is at least k3
with probability at least 34 .
Therefore, by union bound, with probability at least 14 , we have that there are at least
k
3 critical
edges and there are no cycle consists of only critical edges. So in this case, we have opt ≤ k− k3 = 2k3 .
Therefore, the expectation of the optimal total cost is at most E[opt] ≤ 34k + 14 2k3 = 11k12 .
By our assumption on M , we get that the expected total cost of the outcome chosen by M is
at most 11k12 +
k
24 =
23k
24 . In other words, the expected number of critical edges chosen by M is at
least k24 . That is,
n∑
i=1
Pr[edge i is chosen | edge i is critical]Pr[edge i is critical] ≥ k
24
.
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Note that Pr[edge i is critical] = 12k for all i ∈ [n] and n =
(k
2
)
= k(k−1)2 , we get that on average
a critical edge is chosen with at least constant probability
1
n
n∑
i=1
Pr[edge i is chosen | edge i is critical] ≥ 1
6
.
On the other hand, it is easy to see
n∑
i=1
Pr[edge i is chosen | edge i is not critical]Pr[edge i is not critical] ≤ k .
By Pr[edge i is not critical] = 1− 12k and n =
(
k
2
)
, we get that on average a non-critical edge is
chosen with very small probability
1
n
n∑
i=1
Pr[edge i is chosen | edge i is not critical] ≤ 2k
2
(2k − 1)n =
4k
(k − 1)(2k − 1) ≤
8
2k − 1 .
Therefore, we have∑n
i=1Pr[edge i is chosen | edge i critical]∑n
i=1Pr[edge i is chosen | edge i is not critical]
≥ 2k − 1
48
.
In particular, there exists an agent i, such that
Pr[edge i is chosen | edge i critical]
Pr[edge i is chosen | edge i is not critical] ≥
2k − 1
48
.
However, the above amount is upper bounded by exp(ǫ) since M is ǫ-differentially private. So
we conclude that ǫ = Ω(k).
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